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ABSTRACT
Willis, Gregory Wayne. M.S., Department of Economics, Wright State 
University, 1990. The Effects of Political Instability on Economic 
Growth: A Case for Sub-Saharan Africa.
The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced both poor 
economic performance and substantial political instability since their 
independence. There have been numerous studies investigating the 
possible relationship between political instability and economic 
growth. The common approach to investigating this relationship is to 
measure the effect of economic growth on the probability of political 
instability. This paper takes the opposite approach by investigating 
the effects of political instability on economic growth. We believe 
that political instability disrupts the economic system causing a 
reduction in growth. We measure this effect using regression 
analysis to estimate two models we have developed. The first model 
is a single equation model where we have expanded a neoclassical 
growth model to include a measure of political instability. The 
second model is a simultaneous model where in addition to the single 
equation above, we have added a second equation to estimate an 
investment variable used in the first equation. We found the 
estimated coefficients for political instability in both models are 
negative with the political instability coefficient for the simultaneous 
model some 18.7 percent larger than for the single equation OLS 
model. Given whatever model is used, the results that we have 
found supports the theory that political instability reduces economic 
growth. Therefore, any policy action taken by decision makers in 
Sub-Saharan Africa concerning economic growth, would have to 
address the problem of political instability.
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INTRODUCTION
It has long been known that individuals are separated by those 
who have and those who do not. Like individuals, countries are also 
divided according to their relative wealth. On one end of the 
spectrum are the industrialized countries who possess great wealth 
and income, and often engage in conspicuous consumption. On the 
other end of the spectrum exist the poor nations of the Third World, 
where incomes are so low, consumption is often only for subsistence. 
These wealthier countries have been referred to as the developed 
countries, whereas the poorer countries have been labelled the less- 
developed countries (LDCs).
There have been numerous studies to determine why some 
countries develop and others do not. The results of these studies 
often find as many reasons as there are studies. However, there 
have been some generally accepted conclusions made from these 
studies, but no all encompassing theory for explaining differences in 
levels of development among nations has come forth.
Different schools of thought have stressed different factors in 
explaining the differences in growth across countries. Neoclassical 
economists stress the importances of factors of production such as 
labor and capital, assuming that the institutional framework within 
which the factors of production work exists. Institutional economists 
on the other hand stress the importance of the availability of 
efficient and stable economic, social, and political institutions without 
which factors of production cannot do any good. Indeed Reynolds
(1983) argues that political stability is the single most important 
factor that explains differences in the long term economic growth 
among nations. The dependency school attributes lack of 
development in LDCs to the unequal relationships between LDCs and 
developed countries (DCs).
Though there seems to be contradiction among the various 
schools of thought, it is easy to reconcile the apparent contradictions. 
Each school of thought seem to emphasize one aspect of factors that 
influence economic development. It is clear that without the proper 
institutional structures that set up the parameters within which 
exchange, production, and consumption takes place, there can be no 
long term development. Dependency theories stress how 
international linkages distort institutions in LDCs, thus making it 
harder for them to achieve long term economic growth. Any 
reasonable model of economic growth should therefore include both 
the institutional and "technological " aspects: This paper will attempt
to do that.
The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of political 
instability on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is our belief 
that political instability creates a sense of short-term uncertainty. 
This uncertainty causes a destabilizing effect in the functions and 
actions of institutions and economic agents within an economic 
system. It does this by creating additional risk and breaking down 
the cohessiveness of workers. The addition of risk and the 
breakdown of unity disrupts the normal economic process, thus
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causing a decline in economic growth. A look into Sub-Saharan 
Africa's past economic performance and political instability would 
seem to suggest that a possible relationship exist between the two.
S U B - S A H A R A N
PERFORMANCE
It seems that in Sub-Saharan Africa no matter what measure of 
development one uses, the result is underdevelopment. Sub-Saharan 
Africa had great hopes for growth and development after gaining 
independence from colonial powers in the 1960s. These hopes still 
remain only hopes. Morawetz reported that growth in LDCs between 
1950-75 was greater than in the DCs for the same period. Thus, the 
gap between developed and developing countries had narrowed. 
Unfortunately, Sub-Saharan Africa did not share in this growth; the 
gap between DCs and Sub-Saharan Africa widened over the period.
Some basic indicators of development have shown Sub-Saharan 
Africa to be among the poorest of all LDCs (see Table 1). Average 
annual growth rate of GNP per capita for Sub-Saharan Africa was 
only .6 percent for the period 1965-87. This was the lowest growth 
rate of all LDC groupings. The LDC region with the next lowest GNP 
per capita growth rate was South Asia, which had a substantially 
higher rate of 1.8%. East Asia lead all LDC groupings with a 5.1% 
growth rate for the period.
GNP per capita in 1987 dollars showed Sub-Saharan Africa to 
have the second lowest of the groupings. South Asia's $290 just beat 
out Sub-Saharan Africa's $330 for that honor. The highest GNP per
capita values reported were those for the Europe, Middle East and 
North Africa, and Latin America and Caribbean.
Another important measure of "development" stressed has been 
a country's life expectancy. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest life 
expectancy of all LDC groupings. Life expectancy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa was only 51 years of age in 1987. The next lowest life 
expectancy in LDCs was 57 years of age for South Asia. The highest 
life expectancy of the LDC groupings is in East Asia, where a person is 
expected to live until 68.
The growth rate of investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
up and down since the 1960s. From 1960-65 investment growth 
was 7.9 percent, about average for the LDC groups. The greatest 
growth in investment for this period occured in South Asia. This 
group of countries achieved a growth rate of 11.1 percent for the 
period. From 1965-1980 investment in Sub-Saharan Africa showed 
some improvement from the previous period. Sub-Saharan Africa in 
this period had the second highest growth rate of all LDC groupings. 
Only East Asia’s growth rate of 11.3 percent was greater than Sub- 
Saharan Africa's 9.3 percent.
After improving investment in Sub-Saharan Africa between 
1965-80, things turned sour. During the period from 1980-87 the 
growth rate of investment was a negative 8.3 percent. Though all 
LDC groups, except East Asia, experienced a decline in the growth of 
investment from the previous period, Sub-Saharan Africa's decline 
was the most dramatic.
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The need for improvements in agriculture has also been 
suggested as necessary for LDCs to achieve economic growth. 
Agriculture productivity in LDCs is low and food output is often for 
personal consumption only. Improvement in agriculture is assumed 
to imply not only increases in output, but also increases in income of 
farm households. Many economist point to the need for the 
agriculture output to increase to support the developing  
manufacturing sector. Increased output would not only be used to 
feed the manufacturing sector, but also provide increased income to 
allow farmers to buy newly manufactured goods. Even if agriculture 
is not used to support the manufacturing sector, it is still important 
to feed the population so as not to run up large deficits in trade due 
to importing food.
There has been debate among economists who have suggested 
the need of producing export crops and those who suggest food crops 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Those who favor export crop production 
believe that not only will income from these crops pay for the 
imports of food but will produce enough surplus of funds to be used 
in purchasing other needed goods and services. Those who support 
the production of food crops raise the question of the risk involved in 
export production. Since Sub-Saharan African countries are so 
dependent on world economic conditions, any recession would likely 
affect exports, hence income. In times of recessions, these countries 
would be unable to feed themselves. Even though the export crops
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may have returns far greater than those of food crops, the risk of 
starvations is too great.
Agricultural growth in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and 
1965 was neither high nor low compared with those of other LDC 
groupings. Agriculture grew at a rate of 2.3 percent, not as high as 
East Asia’s 4.6 percent yet not as low as South Asia's LI percent 
growth. From 1965-80 Sub-Saharan Africa's growth in agriculture 
was the worst of all LDC groups. The growth rate fell to 1.7 percent.
In the 1980-87 period, growth of agricultural output fell even 
farther in Sub-Saharan Africa. Growth in this period was only 1.2 
percent compared with the exceptional growth rate of 5.9 percent 
that East Asia experienced.
Export growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has been for the most part 
average when compared with other LDCs. From 1960-65 exports 
grew at a rate of 5.9 percent. In the period from 1965-80, Sub- 
Saharan Africa's exports grew even higher at a rate of 6.6 percent.
Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a substantial decline in the 
growth rate of exports in the period from 1980-87. The growth rate 
of exports was a negative 1 percent. All other LDC groups 
experienced an increase in their growth of exports for this period.
If the educating of the population is considered a sign of 
development, Sub-Saharan Africa is severly lacking. Education levels 
in Sub-Saharan Africa have improved since 1965, but are still much 
lower than other developing regions. The total percentage of the 
school age population in Sub-Saharan Africa enrolled in primary
6
school in 1965 was 41 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa increased their
enrollment figure to 66 percent in 1987.
Secondary enrollment in Sub-Saharan Africa grew from only 4 
percent in 1965 to 16 percent in 1986. Yes, this is a 400 percent
increase, but it should be kept in mind that only 16 percent of the
population in enrolled in secondary schools. Sub-Saharan Africa's 16 
percent enrollment rate is only half the next lowest LDC groups' 
enrollment rate.
The main thrust of education in Sub-Saharan Africa seems to be 
to provide primary education. Education participation rate after 
primary schooling drops dramatically. Providing secondary and 
post-secondary education to the masses may seem to be inefficient 
to LDCs because many of the jobs in their countries involve low skill 
levels. Their manufacturing involves labor intensive technologies in 
which a primary education is probably enough to perform these 
tasks.
Because it may not be efficient to provide post-secondary 
education to a few students, many countries subsidizes students who 
travel to DC universities to get their education. Of course in some 
instances there has been cases of "BRAIN DRAIN". Foreign students 
often find life in DCs to be very appealing.
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TABLE 1
PAST ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 
STATISTICS
S u b -S a h a ra n  South Asia East Asia Middle East, Latin
Africa N. Africa & America
S. Europe
Avg. growth 
rate GNP per 
capita 1965-87 .6 1.8 5.1 2.5 2.1
GNP per capita 
1987 dollars 330 290 470 1940 1790
Life expectancy 
in 1987 51 57 68 64 66
Growth of gross 
domestic invest­
m ent:
1960-65 7.9 11.1 8.6 -3.1* 4.51965-80 9.3 4.6 11.3 9.0 8.31980-87 -8.3 3.7 12.1 -4.5
Growth of
agricu lture:
1960-65 2.3 1.1 4.6 1.6* 3.61965-80 1.7 2.7 3.3 3.5 3.21980-87 1.2 1.4 5.9 2.2
Growth of
exports:
1960-65 5.9 4.6 7.2 1.3 6.11965-80 6.6 1.7 9.7 -2.1




1965 41 68 88 83 98
1987 66 84 123 97 108
Secondary:
1965 4 29 23 32 19
1987 16 32 45 56 48
* represents where Southern Europe was not used in calculating these figures 
All data for this table was compiled using World Bank staistics.
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POLITICAL INSTABILITY
Political instability seems to be common among Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Mbaku (1988) has stated that there have been 56 coups 
between 1 Jan. 1956 and 30 April 1984. As of 1984, only six 
countries had not experienced coups, attempted coups, or plots. They 
were Botswana, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritius, and
Swaziland. The question why is political instability so widespread in 
Sub-Saharan Africa may be found in why these six countries have 
had none. McGowen and Johnson (1984) have offered a possible 
explanation of why these six countries are free of elite instability. 
The reason given for Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland not having 
instability was its relationship with South Africa. South Africa is 
thought to be a protector of the present regimes of these countries 
for their own security. McGowen and Johnson have suggested that 
the other three countries are simply too small in size, and
insignificant in economic and political power.
Political instability is often defined as a deviation from accepted 
patterns of political behavior such as a challenge to the present 
political authority that is not through constitutional means. Many 
authors may only include "violent" challenges to the political system, 
but this would leave out "peaceful" challenges such as strikes and 
demonstration which can cause political disruption.
Mbaku (1988) list three types of political instability, Elite, 
Communal, and Mass. Elites are those persons who hold high
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positions in institutions which allocate resources. Elite instability, 
therefore, is the forceful removal of these persons by other members 
of the elite. The type of challenge common to Elite instability 
includes coups, attempted coups, and plots.
The second type of political instability is Communal. Communal
groups consists of members who share common characteristics, such 
as ethnicity, religion, language, territory or combination of these 
traits. Behaviors usually associated with Communal instability are 
civil wars, rebellions and ethnic violence. From these activities it is
easily seen that most Communal instability is violent.
The final political instability category, Mass instability, involves 
the attack on leaders of the present political system by members 
who are joined together by common goals and objectives. Mass 
instability members differ from Communal groups by being based on 
goals and objectives rather than common social traits.
Some examples of political instability that have taken place in 
Africa are:
13 Jan. 1963. TOGO: Members of the army assassinate President
Sylvanus Olympio in front of the U.S Embassey, and hand over to 
Nicholas Grunitzky.
24 Feb. 1966. GHANA: While President Kwame Nkrumah was out of
the country, military units led by Col. Kofoka placed retired Major- 
General Joseph Ankrah as Head of State.
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19 Nov. 1968. MALI: The army led by Lieutenant Moussa Traore
overthrew the civilian regime of President Modibo Keita in a 
bloodless coup.
13 Jan. 1972. GHANA: While Prime Minister Kofi Busia was abroad,
the military led by Colonel Ignatius K. Acheampong seized power.
1 Sept. 1981. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: The army under the
leadership of General Andre Kolingba overthrew the regime of 
President David Dacko.
3 Apr. 1984. GUINEA: Three days after the funeral of President
Ahmad Sekou Toure, the military led by Colonel Lansana Conte took 
over the Government in a bloodless coup to prevent a power struggle 
among Toure's civilian successors.
Given the poor economic performance and a high degree of 
political instability that has occured in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
past, many researchers have found the relationship between the two 
occurrences to be important enough to investigate a possible 
relationship between the two. The studies done on the subject have 
for the most part been dominated by politcal scientists. It is their 
view that poor economic performance leads to political instability. 
They believe poor performance of the economy causes the population 
to become unhappy with decision makers. This displeasure can 
cause either the population to take action or it may give other 
specific groups an excuse to take action.
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The empirical results from these studies support this view.
Researchers have found that poor economic performance increases 
the probability of political instability.
This study focuses on the effects of political instability on 
economic growth. This is in no way an attempt to refute the results 
suggesting that economic problems do have effects on political 
instability, but to investigate the possibility that the causation flows 
from political instability to economic stagnation. We feel that both 
theories of causation can exist simultaneously. All we are saying is 
that given the cause of political instability, political instability will in 
turn cause a decline in economic growth.
It is perhaps the belief that the two theories refute each other 
that is responsible for the lack of work done in determining the
effects of political instability on economc growth. Many researchers 
may feel it is not necessary to investigate the effects of political
instability on economic growth given the findings for the reverse. It
is our hope that this study will add to the literature by investigating 
the effects of political instability on economic growth.
To measure the effects of politcal instability on economic growth, 
we have developed two models; one using a single equation and the 
other using simultaneous equations. The single equation model is 
based on a neoclassical growth model with the addition of a measure 
of political instability. The simultaneous equation model uses the 
same equation as above, with the addition of an equation to estimate 
an investment variable in the original equation. The simultaneous
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equation model will not only allow for measuring the direct effect of 
political instability on economic growth, but the indirect effect 
through investment.
To estimate our model, we will use cross-national time-series 




McGowan and Johnson (1984) investigated the relationship 
between African military coups and underdevelopment in their 
cross-sectional study of 39 Sub-Saharan countries. They regressed 
the dependent variable total military involvement score (T.M.I.S.) on 
a number of independent variables. T.M.I.S. is a simple weighted 
sum of coups, attempted coups, and plots. These three activities 
were measured for each country from 1 Jan. 1956 to 30 Apr. 1984. 
Coups were arbitrarily given the value of 5, attempted coups 
received a score of 3, and a value of 1 was assigned to plots. The 
T.I.M.S. was scaled in such a way that the most serious received the 
highest value and the least serious received the lowest.
When the variable T.M.I.S. was regressed on the average growth 
of GNP per capita, the results were; T.M.I.S. (1956-4/84) = 9.318 - 
2.99 (average GNP per capita growth 1960-81) with a R square of 
.234. The results show that there is indeed a negative relationship 
between T.M.I.S. and economic development. McGowan and Johnson 
have interpreted these results as suggesting that economic growth is 
the key to reducing political instability.
We are somewhat critical of McGowan and Johnson's study, in 
that they failed to report any t-values for their coefficients. Without 
such t-values it is impossible to determine if the economic growth 
variable is statistically singificantly different from zero. McGowan 
and Johnson also modeled T.M.I.S. against time ( a so called proxy for 
political and economic processes) and found that time accounted for
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47.1% of the total variation in T.I.M.S. We believe they may have 
found a correlation rather than a causal relationship, since they 
provide no economic or political theory suggesting the reason for 
using time to proxy economic or political processes.
Mbaku (1988) investigated the relationship between elite 
instability and economic development. His study was a cross­
national analysis of 35 African states with elite instability being 
measured for the period from 1956-1985. He modelled the 
dependent variable, elite instability, against the independent 
variables average change in GNP per capita (1960-81), GNP per 
capita for 1981 (in U.S. dollars), percent of labor force in industry in 
1980, the Physical Quality of Life Index, average annual percent 
change in population 1960-81, average annual percentage change in 
urban population 1970-81, natural logrithim of population 1981, and 
military expenditures as a percentage of GNP 1981. Mbaku 
developed his model to examine the relationship of both economic 
development and socioeconomic change to elite instability. The 
socioeconomic change variables are those dealing with population 
and the military expenditures as a percentage of GNP
Mbaku found that variables which reflect economic growth or 
development had a negative relationship with elite instability. The 
coefficients for these variables were for the most part statistically 
insignificant at any reasonable level of significance. The exception 
was Physical Quality of Life Index which reported a t-value of 1.58. 
The variable representing industrialization had a positive
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relationship, but was statistically insignificant with a t-value of only 
1.08.
Mbaku's socioeconmic variables show a positive relationship for 
both the growth of population for 1960-81 and the natural logrithm 
of population 1981. But again, his t-values were too low for the 
coefficients to be staistically significant. Military expenditures and 
the growth in urban popluation coefficients point to a negative 
relationship existing with elite instability. Their respective t-values 
were 1.27 and 1.20.
In Mbaku's study, he failed to give any rationale for the 
inclusion of so many variables measuring economic growth or 
development. The same holds true for the use of the population 
variables. We can only assume that he could not choose among the 
wide selection of variables and decided to include them all. The 
price he paid for doing this was multicollinearity. The cause of his 
low t-values were probably due to multicollinearity among the like 
variables. He did achieve a relatively high R-square (.35), but this is 
not supprising considering the number of variables used.
O'Leary and Coplin (1975) have attempted to predict political 
instability by showing its relationship to numerous variables. They 
regressed elite and communal instability against population size, 
ethnic pluralism, social m obilization, urbanization, national 
integration, interest-group, size of Government, econom ic  
performance, political party unity, and external support. O'Leary and 
Coplin found poor economic performance to have an influence on
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political instability. But they found that standardized coefficients 
showed economic performance to be less important in explaining 
political instability than such variables as population size, interest- 
group size, ethnic pluralism, and social mobilization. The two main 
problems with O'Leary and Coplin's study are the fact that they fail 
to report t-values for individual coefficients and the regression 
method used.
As we have seen, the common approach to economic growth and 
political instability is to measure the effect of economic growth on 
political instability, thus inferring that poor economic performance is 
a determinant of political instability. The studies that have 
investigated the effect of econominc growth on political instability 
have, for the most part, reached the conclusion that poor economic 
performance increases the probability of political instability (namely 
coups). Studies such as those by Mcgowan and Johnson, O'Leary and 
Coplin, and Mbaku have all reached the conclusion that a negative 
relationship between economic growth and political instability exists, 
where economic performance is a determinant to political instability. 
However, ther have been few studies that reverse the direction of 
causation, where political instability leads to economic stagnation.
Londregan and Poole (1990) investigated the relationship 
between economic performance and political instability with the 
possibility that both political instability and economic growth affects 
each other. They modelled political instability with economic growth 
as a determinant, and in turn modelled economic growth with
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political instability as an independent variable. Their sample 
consisted of 121 countries for the period from 1950-1982.
Londregan and Poole modelled the effect of economic growth on 
political instability by using a Probit Model. The model was to 
measure the effect of a set of variables on the probabilty of a Coup d' 
Etat. The set of variables were comprised of recent coups (within the 
last six years), past coups (beyond the last six years), log of last 
period's per capita income, last periods growth rate of per capita GDP, 
and dummy variables for Africa, Europe and north America, South 
America, Central America and Carribean, and Oceania.
Using this model, Londregan and Poole concluded that income 
variables had an inhibiting effect on coups. Specifically, last periods 
log of GDP per capita had a statistically significant negative 
coefficient. They found that a doubling of per capita income would 
lead to a 37.4 percent reduction in the probability of a coup. These 
results confirm the conclusions of other researchers that poor 
economic growth increases the possibility of coups. They also found 
that both measures of coups had a positive effect on the probability
of a coup, with recent coups (coups within the last 6 years) having a
stronger coup inducing effect than past coups.
Londregan and Poole used ordinary least squares regression to 
estimate the effect of coup d' etat on economic performance. They 
used the same sample as was used in their probit model. They also
used the same set of independent variables as the probit model, but
1 8
they regressed them on the dependent variable percent change in 
per capita GDP.
From their model they found that recent coups had a positive 
coefficient of .004, but that is was statistically insignificant with a t- 
value of (.2666). Past coups reported a coefficient of -.003 which 
was staistically significant with a t-value of (3.00). They could give 
no reason as to why past coups effect was negative or for that matter 
why it would be positive. Last period's log of per capita GDP had a 
negative coefficient of -.007 and was statistically significant at a 10 
percent level of significance. Last period's per capita growth rate 
showed a positive relationship with this periods growth rate of per
capita GDP with a statistically significant coefficient of .118.
We do not feel comfortable with Londregan and Poole's 
conclusions about the effect of political instability on economic 
performance due to the method that they used to arrive at these 
conclusions. It is our belief that their model was mispecified, 
therefore their conclusion are not accurate since they were based on 
the results from the model. The first thing about the model that 
should be questioned is the use of the same set of independent
variables for determining both coups and economic performance. 
What is the likelihood of both coups and economic performance 
having the same determining factors? Another problem we see is
the use of last period GDP per capita growth rate as a determinant 
for this period's. Last periods growth rate has no economic basis for 
saying anything about this period's growth rate.
1 9
Another problem we see in their model is the measurement of 
coups. The effects that we believe they were trying to measure with 
recent and past coups were the short and long-term effects. The 
problem is that recent and past coups are measured in a way that 
the short and long-term effects are merged. It is our opinion that 
the short-term effect of coups should be measured for coups 
happening at least within the past 2 years, if not the past year. Their 
measurement of recent coups is for coups within the last 6 years, 
while past coups are measured as coups that occurred more than six 
years ago. This would seem to merge the short and long-term effects 
of coups. Since the short and lon-term effects of coups may be 
different, the coefficient from this variable may be biased.
Given the finding of previous studies and the fact that the effects 
of political instability on economic growth has been little researched, 
we have chosen to investigate whether political instability has an 
effect on economic growth. We are not trying to disprove the role of 
economic performance in determining the occurrance of political 
instability. We are only saying that political instability, whatever its 
causes, will cause poor economic performance. Even if poor economic 
performance causes political instability in the first place, the political 
instability will cause even poorer performance. Therefore, we feel 
that finding a reverse relationship between economic growth and 
political instability will not contradict previous findings.
Our study will differ from Londregan and Poole's by improving 
both the growth model and the measurement of political instability.
20
The growth model will include other "inputs" instead of just past 
output as determinants to economic growth. The political instability 
variable will only be to measure the short-term effects on economic 
growth. The effects of the political instability variable we use here 
will measure the effects of political instability within the past year.
2 1
MODEL
Since our study focuses on the short-term effects of political
instability on economic growth, it is necessary to include a measure 
of political instability in an economic growth equation. The 
neoclassical approach to modeling economic growth has stressed the 
im portance of assets such as land, labor, capital, and 
entrepreneurship. These assets or factors of production have been 
broken down to more specific areas of importance for economic 
growth in LDCs in general and Sub-Saharan Africa specifically. 
Economists have pointed to the need for improvements in the 
specific areas of investment, foreign trade, and human resource 
developm ent.
A net investment in capital is considered a primary source of 
economic growth. This investment may be in items such as
machinery or infrastructure projects, both having the potential 
impact of expanding the production capacity of a country. 
Considering that capital is an input to production, any addition to the 
capital stock of a country through investment would increase output 
if the productivity of to capital, at least, remained constant. The 
hope is that new capital will have an increased level of technology 
that will not only increase the capital stock but increase the
productivity of capital, thus decreasing the capital-output ratio.
Given the role of investment as an input to production, most 
economist call for an increase in investment. It should be noted that 
it is not only the quantity of investment that matters, but the
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appropriateness and quality of investment also matter. There are 
instances where LDCs have spent valuable resources on increasing 
their capital stock only to find that new capital makes the production 
process less efficient. Energy sources in LDCs are often scarce and 
expensive, thus if new capital requires large amounts of energy it 
may be inefficient to use. Also, in Sub-Saharan Africa, like many 
LDCs, capital goods often go unused due to a lack of spare parts. The 
high initial cost of capital goods may be met by LDCs, but they are 
often unable to pay for the high cost of spare parts that keep the 
capital goods functioning. Therefore, if new capital results in a 
decrease in the return to capital, output may decrease or increase 
depending on whether the addition to the capital stock offsets the 
decrease in capital's productivity.
Faber and Green (1984) have suggested that investment in Sub- 
Saharan Africa should be on updating previous investments instead 
of investing in new projects. They point to the fact that new projects 
have been undertaken while the existing infrastructure is decaying. 
The possible reason they give for this is that it is often easier to 
secure aid or loans for new projects than it is for updating old 
projects.
In our model we assume that an increase in investment will 
result in an increase in the capital stock. We also assume that with 
an addition to the capital stock, the productivity of capital will 
remain constant or increase. Therefore, an increase in investment 
will result in an increase in output.
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The second factor given for economic growth involves the 
improvement of foreign trade. The ideas in improving foreign trade 
most often stress export expansion. Exports are thought to be linked 
to a country's ability to acquire inputs for production and production 
effeciency. Also, because of competition, export sector is more 
efficient than the non-export sector. This efficiency spills over to the 
non-export sector as exports expands.
Export expansion policies have been pursued to obtain needed 
foreign exchange. Since most LDCs rely on capital goods produced in 
DCs, it is essential for LDCs to obtain foreign exchange to import such 
capital. Foreign aid has not been enough to cover all import needs, 
therefore, LDCs have implemented aggressive export growth policies 
to obtain the needed foreign exchange. Most exports in LDCs consist 
of primary goods or highly labor intensive manufactured goods. For 
example, in 1987, 88 percent of exports in Sub-Saharan Africa were 
compossed of primary products.
Ram (1988) has stated that export growth leads to; (a) increases 
in specialization, (b) greater economies of scale due to enlarged 
market size, (c) higher capacity utilization rates, (d) more rapid 
transfer of technology.
According to Gyimah-Brempong (1991), exports not only allow 
for specialization and scale economies to take place through 
increased market size, but also provides governments a source of 
revenue from export taxes. This revenue can be used to finance 
developm ent projects where private investm ent is unable.
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Therefore, increases in exports will result in increases in the 
availibility of funds for development projects such as building up 
needed infrastructure.
Given the positive role of exports on economic growth, economic 
growth has been hampered by trade barriers that DCs place on LDCs. 
Trade barriers have been estimated to cost LDCs between 2.5 and 9 
percent of their respective GNP (Nafziger 1990). Less-developed 
countries have been looking for better trade relations and in some 
instances have received favorable trade status with DCs. But due to 
the economic power that DCs exert, LDCs are at the mercy of DCs 
generosity.
Another area given as important to economic growth is human 
resource development. It has been suggested that low labor 
productivity in LDCs is not solely due to their low capital ratio, but 
due to poor health and lack of educated and skilled workers. Poor 
health care is no doubt a barrier to reaching a higher level of labor 
productivity. Many workers in LDCs lack basic health care such as a 
balanced diet of nutritional food. The old saying " An army marches 
on its stomach" has merit here. Workers, like soldiers, need proper 
nutrition to function at their jobs. Not only is a worker's diet of 
importance, but health care such as availability of doctors and 
prevention of disease are important to labor productivity. Workers 
must stay healthy if they are to perform to their full capabilities.
Like health care, education and training in LDCs are considered 
important to economic Growth. The educating and training of the
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work force results in better productivity of workers by giving them 
better management and organization skills when employing the 
factors of production. Workers also need to learn new "technical" 
skills that workers of DCs have if LDCs are to compete with DCs in an 
international market. Education is also thought to improve economic 
growth in the future by "producing" workers who are innovative. 
The problem is that many LDCs do not have the facilities or finances 
to educate or train their respective populace. Even when LDCs spend 
large percentages of their Gross National Product (GNP) on education, 
it should be kept in mind that this may not be enough to educate and 
train the work force properly since GNP in these countries itself are 
so low.
To operationalize the importance of investment, human resource 
development, and exports into neoclassical economic growth theory, 
we have chosen to use a variation of a model used by Ram (1987). 
Ram's model expands on the simple production function model by 
including exports as an "input" (equation 1). The idea of exports as 
an additional input to a production function model has been 
developed by researchers such as Chenery (1979), Krueger (1980), 
and Feder (1983). The output equation is given by:
Y=f(L,K,X) (1)
where Y is aggregate real output, L and K are labor and capital inputs 
respectively, and exports are represented by X. Taking the growth
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rate of these variables, we obtain the growth rate of output as a 
function of the growth rate of the explanatory variables. We choose 
a linear functional form of the growth rate equation for estimation 
purposes. The estimated equation is given in (2):
Y = Bo + BlL  + Bid -i- Bx X +u (2)
where the dot over the variables indicates growth rates for the 
variables, I is the growth rate of investment, u is a stochastic error 
term. The signs of all of the coefficients estimated in equation (2) 
should be positive since they are inputs.
The neoclassical model of economic growth may be a necessary 
but not sufficient condition to achieve economic growth. This model 
assumes the existance of an institutional framework that allows 
production and exchange to take place. Though the role of economic 
institutions is not disputed, they are often overlooked due to the 
belief that they are naturally available. Therefore, many economist 
do not emphasize economic institutions when discussing economic 
growth. Reynolds (1983) on the other hand, re-emphasized this 
connection between economic growth and economic institutions in 
explaining why some country's economic performance is better than 
others, given differences in factor endowments. He has mentioned 
that those countries which have had better economic performance 
have also been shown to have the more effective institutions, 
especially political institutions. He thus suggests their inclusion as
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some of the determining factors of economic growth. Reynolds 
argues that political instability is perhaps the most important factor 
that explains the differences in economic growth across nations and 
through time. Sub-Saharan Africa, like many LDCs, have limited 
economic and political institutions both in numbers and effectiveness 
compared with DCs. The economic institutions that they do have are 
often still at an early developmental stage, and therefore their 
fragility makes them susceptible to changes in the economic, social, 
and political environment. This fragility is most evident in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, where independence was only recent. Because of the 
short time that has past since independence, along with the high 
degree of political instability, institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa's are 
extremely fragile.
The basis for our study's inclusion of a political instability 
variable as a determinant to economic growth lies in an institutional 
approach to economic growth. An institutional approach looks at an 
economic system as a set of institutions. An economic system is 
made up of economic, social, and political institutions. These 
institutions are responsible for the acquisition, accumulation, 
distribution, and implementation of the factors of production as well 
as output. Therefore, an economic system, hence economic 
performance, of a country is dependent on its institutions. The 
institutional approach to economic growth differs from that of the 
neoclassical approach by not only stressing the importance of the 
stocks and flows of the factors of production, but the economic agents
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and institutions which guide, manage, and direct these factors (Fei 
and Paauw).
Economic institu tions w ithin the economic system are 
institutions dealing with economic activities in the areas of finance, 
labor, trade, and agriculture. Social institutions in the system are 
responsible for passing on knowledge and skills from one economic
agent to another. Political institutions in an economic system provide 
such things as law and order which allows economic exchange to take 
place by providing norms of economic behavior. Political institutions 
also allow for the distribution of resources and the unity economic
agents need for the success of national economic goals. Political 
institutions are also involved in the creation, maintance, and 
protection of other institutions. As Reynolds has suggested, where 
such institutions do not exist, their absence could impede economic 
growth.
Given the role of political institutions in an economic system, a 
shock, such as political instability, to a polititcal institution(s) would 
likely affect other institutions in the system. Political instability may 
or may not cause the collaspe of a political intitution(s), but in any 
circumstance, it will create uncertainty about the institution(s) in the 
short-run. Due to the influence of political institutions on other 
institutions in the economic system, the uncertainty would likely 
spread to these other institutions. Therefore, political instability will 
have the effect of creating uncertainty not only in political
institutions, but within all the institutions that form an economic
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system. This uncertainty in the other institutions within the
economic system would likely have an effect on the economic
performance of a country
The short-term effect of uncertainty of a political institution on 
economic growth is likely to be negative. Uncertainty will cause the 
risk associated with any economic activity to increase. An increase
in risk will disrupt the institutions responsible for the acquisition, 
accumulation, and distribution of the factors of production. Economic 
institutions such as those dealing with finance, agriculture, and labor 
would likely be negatively affected. Political instability may cause 
panic in the banking industry due to the uncertainty of savings 
accounts. The borrowing of funds from banks may also decrease. 
Investors would likely reduce their investments in a country were 
the stability of political institutions were uncertain. Risk may also 
cause agricultural institutions to cut back on extending credit to 
farmers, thus reducing output. The possible effect of political 
instability on labor institution may be the reduction in the labor 
force itself or the productivity of labor. Labor force participations 
may be affected if  workers feel that their safety may be
compromised due to violent political instability, they may refuse to 
leave the safety of their homes.
Political instability would not only affect the acquisition,
accumulation, and distribution of the factors of production, but how 
these factors are used by economic agents. It is our belief that 
political instability causes the inefficient usage of the factors of
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production by disrupting the motivation of capitalists and workers 
alike.
Fei and Paauw have stated that for economic growth to occur 
nationalism must be present. Nationalism is a cohesive bond that 
unites people based on national interests. It is associated with unity 
and political concensus. Nationalism is essential to economic growth 
in the sense that it allows for economic goals to be defined at a 
national level and it coordinates economic agents in reaching these 
goals. It subsumes factional and regional interests to a national 
interest. The unity associated with nationalism is also essential in 
getting economic agents to work together.
Given that nationalism may be needed to bring economic agents 
together to work for the success of common economic goals, anything 
that causes a breakdown in this cohesiveness or results in the 
uncertainty as to the continuation of this cohesiveness would affect 
the success in reaching economic goals. Since political instability 
involves conflict among groups or individuals, its existence is proof 
that not all groups or individuals are unified. If the populace is not 
unified, different goals may emerge. These goals may contradict one 
another resulting in poor economic performance. Also, this conflict 
among economic agents may cause them to become at odds with one 
another. As a result, economic decisions may become based on 
emotions rather than on concerns for efficiently reaching common 
goals. Even if only a small percentage of economic agents are 
experiencing conflict with one another, it may leave doubt in the
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minds of other economic agents about the cohesiveness of the 
country. If these economic agents feel that there is not enough unity 
to carry out national economic goals, apathy may set in. Therefore, 
they may lack interest in using resources efficiently since they 
believe that goals will not be met anyway.
Due to the short-term effect that political instability has on the 
roles of economic institutions and economic agents, hence economic 
growth, we feel that a political instability variable should be included 
in our model of economic growth. To investigate this aspect, we add 
to the production function model (equation 2), a political instability 
variable to get equation 3 (model A):
/  = Bo + BlL, t  Bit + Bx X - BpiPI +u (3 )
where the PI variable is the measure of political instability and all 
other variables remain the same as defined above (equation 2). The 
sign of the political instability coefficient should be negative.
As we have mentioned above, it is likely that the occurrence of 
political instability would affect investment. Investors would see 
uncertainty that is created by political instability as an added risk. 
Since investors are risk adverse, the growth of investments would 
decline. Therefore, the investment variable in equation (3) would be 
endogenous. If indeed this variable is endogenous and we use 
equation (3) to estimate the effects of the independent variables on 
economic growth, the investment coefficient would be biased.
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Therefore, we propose that a simultaneous equation model be used 
here (model B). Along with equation (3), there should be another 
equation to explain investment. Not only would this equation keep 
estimates from being biased, the equation will also allow us to 
measure the indirect effect of political instability through investment 
on economic growth. The investment equation is given as:
I = Bo + Bv"V" - BpiPI +u (4)
where all variables, except "V" are defined above. The "V" 
represents a set of variables which are determinants of investment. 
The set of "V" variables consist of DeltaQ, Deltaid, and DeltaM. DeltaQ 
is the change in output, Deltaid and DeltaM are the changes in foreign 
aid and imports. DeltaQ is to represent what entrepreneurs were 
expecting demand to be when determining how much investment 
was needed to produce this level of output. The Deltaid variable is 
thought to be a source of additional investment funds from external 
aid to allow for investment. Since investment often involves the use 
of imported capital, changes in imports should reflect changes in 
investment. The signs of our Delta variable's coefficients in equation 
(4) should be positive.
We will test the political instability variable's stability in model 
A by dropping out each of the input variables one at a time. If the 
political instability variable's coefficient keeps the same sign the
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coefficient of political instability can be concluded that it i 




The data used for this study was compiled by the Rand 
corporation and printed in the working draft of DEFENSE AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE DATABASE AND 
CODEBOOK. The data is for 41 Sub-Saharan African states from 1970 
to 1983.
The political instability variable is made up of different conflict 
events that have occurred in Sub-Saharan African countries between 
the period from 1970 to 1983. The categories of conflict are 
assassinations, guerrilla warfare, major government crises, purges, 
riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations. 
A s s a s s in a t io n  are politically motivated murder or attempted 
murders of high ranking government officials.
Guerrilla Warfare is any armed activity carried out by independent 
bands or irregular forces aimed at the overthrow of the present 
regime.
Major Government Crises are any rapidly developing situation that 
threaten to bring the downfall of the present regime that is not 
through constitutional means (excluding revolts).
Purges are the elimination of political opposition members by jailing 
or execution.
R io ts  are any violent demonstration of more than 100 citizens 
involving the use of physical force.
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R e v o l u t i o n s  include any illegal or forced changes in the top 
government elite, successful or unsuccessful.
A nti-G overnm ent D em onstrations includes any peaceful public 
gathering of at least 100 people to oppose government policies or 
authority .
We have assigned values to these conflict events to represent 
their degree of disruption, with the highest value being the more 
severe. The value of 5 was given to revolution. A value of 4 was 
given to guerrilla warfare. A value of 3 was assigned to both
assassinations and major government crises. The value of 2 was
given to both riots and purges, and a value of 1 given to anti­
government demonstrations.
The growth of output variable is measured as the growth rate of 
real gross domestic product. The growth rate of labor variable is 
measured as the growth rate of population. Due to an insufficient 
data on labor characteristics in Sub-Saharan Africa, we were forced 
to use population as a proxy variable.
The growth rate of investment variable is measured as the real 
growth rate of gross domestic investment. Gross domestic
investment is measured as the outlays for the addition of 
reproducable capital goods to the fixed assets of private and public 
enterprises, private nonprofit organizations, the general government, 
and the value of net increases and decreases in inventories. This 
includes all domestically produced items and those produced abroad. 
Government outlays for construction and durable goods for military
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purposes were excluded. This variable was used to exclude those 
expenditures on durable military goods because of their lack of 
production capabilities.
The growth rate of exports variable is measured as the real 
growth rate of exports. Exports are measured as the goods and 
services included in the general exports of merchandise plus exports 
of sevices and purchases from abroad. Transfers of gifts and 
personal effects between households are also included. Exports are 
valued f.o.b. Imports are defined the same as exports except they 
are valued c.i.f.
Aid is the total official development assistance, ODA, provided by 
OECD/D AC members, multilateral agencies, and OPEC countries.
All variables defined are measured in real terms using the 
implicit GDP deflator.
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF DATA 
VARIABLE OBSERVATIONS MEAN STD. DEVTATTON
Y 467 3.330 8.93752
X 464 5.833 28.2720
L 420 2.834 1.02772
I 452 7.887 76.2507
PI 550 2.885 5.91034
DELTAQ 467 3626.5 20952.5
DELTAID 464 365.9 3253.38
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ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
The statistical techniques we will be using for our analysis is 
Ordinary Least-Squares and Two Stage Least-Squares regression. 
Regression analysis is the study of the dependence of one dependent 
variable on the one or more explanatory variables, with the view of 
estimating the population mean of the dependent variable given the 
known values of the explanatory variables.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression will be used for 
estimating the single equation models since it is the best linear 
unbiased estimator (BLUE) with minimum variance.
The method of Two Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) regression was 
chosen for its ability of estimating simultaneous equations. The 
process of 2SLS was developed by Henri Theil. Two stage least-
squares is used when equations contain an endogenous variable as
an explanatory variable. Endogenous only means the the variable is 
not predetermined in the model, or in other words it has its own set 
of explanatory variables. If the endogenous variable is used as a 
explanatory variable, it will result in the disturbance term being
correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable, and hence
results in biased estimates.
A durbin-watson statistic for the model showed that there were 
no problems with auto-correlation. We also checked for multi- 
collinearity among the independent variables using Pearson
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correlation coefficients. Here again, we found no evidence that the 
independent variables are highly correlated with one another.
We did run into a problem with the specification of the
simultaneous model. The second equations used to predict the
growth rate of investment with the independent variables DeltaQ,
Deltaid, DeltaM, and PI resulted in coefficients which were not as 
expected given the theory, which in turn caused coefficients in 
equation (3) to be biased. We assume that this problem was due to 
equation (3) of the model not being specified to account for the
variation in investment across countries. To solve this problem we 
had to model for cross-national and time-series data. We did this by 
using a Least Squared Dummy variable model for equation (3) which 
uses country dummy variables. This technique allows for differences 
in investment among the countries by allowing for different 
intercepts for these countries. We could not use all of the country 
dummies because some were linear combinations. After dropping 
out some of the dummies, the specification problem was solved.
RESULTS
The regression results for model A are presented in Table 2. 
Using an F statistic to test the coefficients of the model together to 
determine if the coefficients are statistically significant from zero, we 
see that the F-value of 28.87 allows us to reject the hypothesis that 
all coefficients are equal to zero. The set of independent variables in 
model A accounted for an adjusted R-square of .2159. In other 
words, 21.59 percent of the variation in the model was account for
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by the set of independent variables. Considering that our sample is 
of a cross-sectional nature along with the fact our coefficients all 
reulted in expected signs, we feel that the model is a "good fit".
The estimated coefficients for model A are also presented in 
Table 2. Here we see that the estimated coefficient for the growth 
rate of exports is .10818. This translates into an increase of .10818 
percentage points in growth of GDP with each percentage point 
increase in the growth rate of exports. The estimated coefficient for 
growth of population is .439725. The growth rate of investment 
resulted in a .037709 percentage point increase in the growth rate of 
GDP with each percentage point increase. The coefficient for the 
political instability variable shows that a negative ralationship exist 
between political instability and the growth rate of GDP. Specifically, 
we see that the coefficient for political instability is -.196958. 
Therefore, with each increase in political instability point the growth 
of rate of GDP would decline by .196959 percentage points.
A t-test for the significance of individual coefficients shows that 
the growth of exports and investment are both statistically 
significant from zero at the 5% level. The growth of population 
variable was not statistically significant. The coefficient for political 
instability did prove to be significant from zero. The t-value of 3.274 
for the political instability coefficient is statistically significant at any 
reasonable level of significance.
The signs of the coefficients for the single equation (3) model 
were as expected. The "input" variable's coefficients were possitve,
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and the sign of the political instability coefficient was negative. 
Therefore, this supports our belief that political instability has a 
negative effect on economic growth.
The results of the simultaneaous equation model can also be 
found in Table 2. Model B used simultaneous equations due to our 
belief that the growth of investment was endogenous. The second 
equation of model B regressed the dependent variable, growth of 
investment, on the independent variables change in aid, change in 
output, change in imports, political instability, and the dummy 
variables for the different countries. The estimated coefficient for 
the change in aid is -.001242. The coefficients reported for the 
change in output and imports are .000228 and .000261 respectively. 
The coefficient for the political instability variable is -1.058758. 
From these results, we see that the effect of political instability is to 
reduce the growth of investment by 1.058758 percentage points for 
each one point increase in the political instability value. According to 
these results investors are highly sensitive to political instability.
A test for individual significance shows that only the change in 
aid and political instability variables are statistically significant at a 
5 percent level of significance.
Using the predicted values from our growth rate of investment 
equation, we estimated the growth rate of GDP equation (3). An F 
statistic of 25.28 allows us to reject the hypothesis that all 
coefficients are equal to zero when tested together. The adjusted R-
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square for the model is .1942. Thus, the total variation explained by 
the independent variables in the model is 19.42 percent.
The coefficient for the growth rate of exports in this model is 
very similar to the one reported for in model A. The coefficient for 
exports reported here is .108707. The growth rate of population 
coefficient for model B dropped substantially to only .307167. 
According to the estimated coefficient of growth rate of investment, 
each percentage point increase in investment resulted in a .14239 
percentage point increase in the growth rate of GDP. The coefficient 
for political instability in model B is much lower than the one 
reported in model A. In model B, the coefficient for political 
instability is -.091382. Therefore, according to this coefficient, the 
direct effect of a one point increase in political instability would be to 
reduce the growth of GDP by .091382 percentage points. When 
testing for individual significance we see some changes from our 
results in model A. Like model A, growth of the population is 
insignificant and both the growth of exports and investment are 
statistically significant at a 5 percent level of significance. In model 
A the political instability coefficient was statistically significant at 
any reasonable level. In model B, we see that the political instability 
coefficient is no longer significant at even a 10 percent level, though 
it does just miss being significant at a 10 percent level of a one tail 
test.
In the growth rate of investment equation (4), we see that the 
variables political instability, change in output, and change in
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imports have the expected signs. Only the negative sign for the 
change in aid coefficeint was a surprise. We had thought that aid 
was given to invest in projects. Therefore, increases in aid would 
mean more investment. A possible reason why a negative 
relationship exist between changes in aid and the growth rate of 
investment may be that aid is used to offset poor investment years. 
Therefore, increases in aid may be associated with years of poor 
investment growth and where the aid is not enough to fully offset 
poor investment growth.
The signs in the growth rate of GDP equation were all as 
expected. The "input" variables all showed to be positive influences 
on the growth rate of GDP. We were also not disappointed in the sign 
of the political instability sign. The model confirmed our contention 
that political instability has a negative effect on the growth rate of 
GDP.
To measure the total effect of political instability on the growth 
rate of GDP, we have to take into account both the indirect and direct 
effects instability. The indirect effect is measure by political
instability's effect on investment (equation 4) and the effects of 
investment on economic growth. Since investment is a determinant 
to economic growth, any effect on it would therefore affect economic 
growth. The direct effect is measured by the political instability 
coefficient in the growth rate of GDP equation (3). The total effect of
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political instability is measured by the following equation:
dY = , « E I  + JL.
dPI PI I PI
where the first set of partial derivatives account for the indirect
effect, and the last partial derivative measures the direct effect.
Calculating the indirect effect, we see that political instability 
reduces the growth rate of GDP through investment by .15076 
percentage points with each additional one point increase.
Combining this indirect effect with the direct effect the total effect on 
the growth of GDP by an increase in the political instability variable 
is .24214 percentage points. The total effect of political instability on 
economic growth, when measured with the single equation model,
shows that a decrease of .19696 percentage points in the growth rate 
of GDP with each one point increase in political instability. From this, 
we see that the single equation model underestimates the total effect 




REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 
MODEL A AND MODEL B
Coefficients: Intercept X L I PI
Model A 1 . 9 6 4 1 2 . 1 0 8 1 8  . 4 3 9 7 2  . 0 3 7 7 - . 1 9 6 9 6
( t - v a l u e )  (1.859) (8.559) (1.283) (4.6) ( - 3 . 2 7 4 )
Adj. R square .2159
S i mul t a ne o us
e o u a t i o n
model B:
(Equation 3) -.09138 1 . 4 1 0 5  . 1 0 8 7 1  . 3 0 7 1 6 . 1 4 2 3 9
( t - v a l u e )  ( 1 . 1 1 8 ) ( 7 . 2 2 4 )  (.752) ( 5 . 8 8 7 ) ( - 1 . 2 1 8 )
Adj. R square .1942
Coefficients: DeltQ Del taid DeltaM PI
(Equation 4) .000228 - . 0 0 1 2 4  . 0 0 0 2 6 1  - 1 . 0 5 8 7
( t - v a l u e )  ( 1 . 5 6 5 )  ( - 1 . 7 5 4 )  ( 1 . 1 5 3 )  ( - 2 . 5 0 9 )
R square . 0 9 8 7
NOTE: with the no intercept option the R-square definition 
is changed to: l-(residual sum of squares/uncorrected total
sum of squares).
* represents all the dummy variables used for the different 




We tested the stability of the coefficients of the political 
instability variable by dropping a single variable among the "input" 
variables in model A. The results were that in each case the the sign 
of the political instability coefficient remained negative (see Table 3). 
Only the absolute magnitude of the coefficient changed. The most 
significant change occurred when the investment variable was 
dropped from the model. The political instability coefficeint 
increased by 19 percent when this happened. This is not surprising 
since we have indicated that political instability may affect the 
growth rate of investment, as well as directly affecting economic 
growth.
Theoretically, we have stated that political instability is likely to 
affect both the accumulation, distribution, and the usage of the 
factors of productions. To measure these effects, we added a political 
instability variable to a neoclassical growth model. Since political 
instability may affect investment, we added another equation to the 
model to measure this effect. This leaves us with deciding which 
model is best, the single equation model or simultaneous equation 
model.
The results we obtained in the second equation of the 
simultaneous model have strenghted the case for using such a model.
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CONCLUSION
The data used for this study was a combination a cross-national 
and time-series for 41 Sub-Saharan African states from 1970 to 
1983. The purpose of this study was to determine if political 
instability had a negative short-term effect on economic growth in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. As stated before, we believe that political 
instability causes a disruption in the ability of institutions and 
economic agents to perform their economic functions. Thus political 
instability disrupts the accumulation, distribution, and usage of the 
factors of production, and hence economic growth. To measure this 
disruptive force of political instability, we developed two models. 
The first model was a simple production function model with the 
addition of an export and political instability variable. This model 
was estimated using OLS techniques. The second model was a 
simultaneous equation model. Along with the growth equation, we 
added a second equation to measure the indirect effect of political 
instability on economic growth through investment. The reason for 
this equations stems from the thought that political instability 
induces uncertainty which investors translate into risk. Therefore, 
any added risk will cause investors to cut back on investments.
Our regression results for both models have shown that indeed 
there is a negative relationship between political instability and 
economic growth. We feel, however, that the use of the simultaneous 
eqation model, where political instability’s effect is measured both
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directly and indirectly, is the proper model to use. According to our 
simultaneous equation model's coefficients, the total effect of political 
instability is to reduce the economic growth rate by .24214 
percentage points with each one point increase in its value. This 
would imply that a coup, which has a value of 5, would decrease the 
economic growth rate by 1.2107 percentage points. Using a single 
equation OLS model, we find that a point increase in political 
instability results in a .19696 decrease in the economic growth rate. 
It can be seen that political instability can severely affect the 
economic growth of an African state regardless of whether we use a 
simultaneous equation model or a single equation OLS model.
A comparison of our results with the results of others is almost 
impossible due to the diffferent approaches taken on the subject. 
The common approach to the relationship between economic growth 
and political instability is to treat economic growth as determining 
political instability. The researchers who have taken such an 
approach have almost unanimously found that economic growth does 
inhibit political instability.
The one study that we found that takes the same approach to 
the subject as we do, found no short-term statistical significant effect 
on economic growth. This study by Londregan and Poole had some 
short cummings though. We did not agree with their specification of 
their model or their measurement of a short-term effect. Therefore, 
a direct comparison of their results with ours would not benefit 
either study.
5 1
We should state that even though we found political instability 
to have a statistically significant negative effect on economic growth, 
this does not contradict the findings of other researchers who found 
that economic growth has a negative effect on political instability. 
Both theories of causation can exist simultaneously. All our findings 
show is that whatever causes political instability, political instability 
has a negative effect on economic growth. If poor economic 
performance causes political instability, it will in turn cause poorer 
economic performance.
There are a wide range of factors that have attributed to Africa's 
poor economic performance, such as climate, diseases, and outside 
constraints on economic trade. Besides these uncontrollable factors 
there are also internal or controllable factors which have been 
pointed to by researchers. Besides the disruption from political 
instability, other controllable factors such as forced industrialization 
and heavy government involvement in the markets have been 
pointed to as responsible in part to slow development. It would be 
irresponsible to suggest that by reducing internal political conflict in 
Africa the economic performance problems would be solved, but not 
to recognize the adverse effects of political instability would be 
equally irresponsible. In this sense, we only suggest that political 
instability in Sub-Saharan Africa be considered as a barrier to 
economic development. Therefore, any policy action to stimulate 
economic growth would have to address the problem of internal 
conflict along with any other problems Sub-Saharan Africa faces.
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This paper, at least, focuses on the need to investigate the 
relationship between political instability and economic growth in 
LDCs generally, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular.
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NOTES
1) These are a sample of coups which appeared in McGowan and Johnson's 
1988 article "African Military Coups d'etat and Underdevelopment; a 
Quantitative Historical Analysis"
2) Data is from "World Development Report 1989" The World Bank, 
O xford  University Press, 1989.
3) A few notes to clarify the meaning of uncertainty. Uncertainty is 
always common since people are unable to see into the fu ture. But here, 
we refer to uncertainty as being in addition to the normal level of 
uncertainty. Where the probability given to the occurance of an event is 
severely affected. Another idea relating to the spread of uncertainty from 
political institutions to other institutions within the economic system  
should be clearified. One would likely point to political instability in the 
DCs to show that little if any uncertainty had spread to other institutions. 
The above scenerio for political instability was not meant to be for all 
countries. We only suggest that this happens in LDCs due to the 
infancy of their institutions. The institutions in the DCs have become 
more developed, thus stronger, enabling them to withstand all but the 
most severe instances of political instability.
4) We should note here that conflict is common to all countries, but in 
most nations conflict does not grow to the point of being classified as 
political instability. The reason why conflict in LDCs may have a
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tendency to develop into political instability may be due to the lack of 
institutions to resolve such conflict.






















6) The countries that had to be dropped from the model were:
ANGOLA GUINEA
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